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The large Federal deficit of 1975-76 has in-
spired a critical debate. The issue-to what
extent does deficit-inspire~ Treasury borrowing
replace or "crowd out" private borrowing in
U.S. credit markets? Private borrowing is
crowded out in one sense whenever an increased
Federal deficit inspires the Treasury to raise an
additional dollar in the market for private sav-
ings.For that matter, when any borrower en-
ters this market with an increased need for
funds, other borrowers must compete more
keenly, and pay more for available savings. In
this way, credit is rationed and savings in-
creased. The presence of the Treasury in the
credit markets is the direct effect of fiscal policy
upon interest rates, but there are indirect effects
of fiscal policy upon interest rates as well.
This paper, like other discussions ofcrowding
out, attempts to consider the totality of the Fed-
eral Government impact upon capital markets.
To do this we analyze two time periods over
which government policies may have distinct
effects upon capital markets-the short run and
the long run. By short run effects, we mean the
temporary effects of government policies to re-
duce the impact of a recession-policies whose
effects would be neutralized by other policies at
other stages of the business cycle. An example
would be a recessionary Federal deficit, which
would be offset by a surplus at the peak of the
business cycle. Long run policies, on the other
hand, are at work through all stages of the busi-
ness cycle. Examples would include the average
rate of growth in the money supply over a
decade, or the tendency of the Federal budget
to be in deficit throughout the business cycle.
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In the first part of the paper we analyze the
long-run effects of fiscal policy upon capital
markets. Fromthese conclusions, we move to a
discussion of the effects of short run fiscal stim-
ulus upon an economy inthe depths of a reces-
sion. The strength of the short-run impact of
fiscal stimulus upon economic growth is still a
matter of debate among economists. Wethere-
fore present two extreme positions-first the
argument,that fiscal policy.has no impact upon
economic.growth, then the argument that fiscal
stimulus is essential to promote recovery from a
recession. In each of these two cases, we con-
sider the implications of the assumed behavior
of the economy for capital markets and for the
central issue-the question of crowding out.
This leads to some interesting conclusions about
the use of fiscal policy.
The long run fiscal policy effects
To analyze the long run effects offiscal policy
upon capital markets we consider a permanent
increase in the average level of government bor-
rowing. In our analysis, we draw an extended
analogy, comparing the long run effects of in-
creased government demand upon the market
for capital to the long run effects of increased
government demand upon the market for cur-
rent production.
What is the long term effect of government
entry into the marketplace? Economists are
generally agreed that if the government in-
creases its expenditures, the long term rate of
real economic growth remains unaffected. That
is, fiscal policy cannot permanently raise the
aggregate demand for goods and services ineither real or nominal terms. If government
expenditures increasepermanently, the eventual
effect will be that government expenditures will
replace, or "crowd out" an equal quantity of
private expenditures, leaving the rate of growth
in·GNP unchanged..The basis for this proposi-
tion is that over the long term, GNP growth
depends upon things more fundamental than
fiscal and monetary policy, such as technology,
individual tastes, and the supply of factors of
production. The long-run neutrality of fiscal
policy effects upon GNP growth also has impli-
cations for the effects of fiscal policy upon in-
flation. Since fiscal policy cannot increase ag-
gregate demand over the long term, it also can-
not increase the rate of inflation.
Iffiscal policy has a neutraleffect upon GNP,
it also has a neutral long-run effect upon capital
markets. That is, a permanent increase in gov-
ernment borrowing may not permanently in-
crease the rate of growth in private saving.
Private saving will remain unchanged from its
long-term trend regardless of the extent of gov-
ernment borrowing. When increases in govern-
ment borrowing are neutral, in the sense that
they have no effect upon the rate of increase in
private saving, a permanent increase in govern-
ment borrowing will necessarily create an equal
reduction in private investment. Interest rates
must therefore play a long term role similar to
prices. An increase in government borrowing
has no long term effect upon interest rates be-
cause it is offset by an equal reduction in private
investment, leaving the long term net demand
for savings unchanged.
Unlike the government expenditure effect, a
long-term increase in the rate of monetary ex-
pansion does have an effect upon prices. Prices
go up, bringing the real value of money balances
in line with long term trends in GNP growth.
Since money growth determines the long term
growth in prices, monetary policy alone can in-
crease nominal GNP. Similarly, while a per-
manent increase in government borrowing does
not raise interest rates over the long term, a
permanent increase in the rate of monetary ex-
pansion does raise interest rates permanently.
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This is a result of the well-known Fisher effect.
A permanent increase in the rate of money
growth leads to a permanent increase in the ex-
pected rate of inflation and therefore to an in-
crease in interest rates, so thatsavers may retain
the purchasing power implicit in their interest
payments.
This analysis leads to some reasonable con-
clusions about the long-term realities of crowd-
ing out in capital markets. First, a permanent
increase in government borrowing does notper-
manently increase interest rates. Instead, there
is a permanent decrease in the level of private
investment at old rates of interest. In other
words, although increased government borrow-
ing in the long run crowds out an equal amount
of private investment, this crowding out does
not result in higher rates of interest, although
the government share of private saving is per-
manently increased. On the other hand, a per-
manent increase in the rate of monetary expan-
sion does increase interest rates via the Fisher
effect.
These conclusions appear to fly in the face of
much of the current analysis of the crowding-
out question. Often in these analyses-where
the focus is on the short rather than the long run
-responsibility for increases in interest rates,
and therefore for crowding-out, is laid at the
feet of tight monetary policy rather than easy
fiscal policy. The argument is that with suffi-
cient monetary expansion, increased govern-
ment borrowing need not lead to increases in
interest rates and therefore need not create
crowding out in capital markets.
Indeed, analysts of the crowding out question
frequently base their arguments on one of two
options: (I) assume the Federal Reserve will
decide to create sufficient credit through mone-
tary expansion to hold short-term interest rates
low, so that crowding out will not occur; or
(2) assume the Fed, outofconcern for inflation,
will stick to a money growth path insufficient to
hold interest rates down, so that crowding out
will occur.
Our analysis suggests that interest rate in-
creases are, over the longterm, a poor measureof theeffect of governmentborrowingonprivate
borrowers' share of the market for private sav-
ings. Government borrowing does not create
crowding out at higher interest rates; rather,
government borrowing leads to a reduction in
the private share of national savings at the old
rates of interest. Therefore, those authors who
consider deficits as placing upward pressure
uponinterest rates andmonetary policy as plac-
ing downward pressure upon rates refer to
short~run phenomena, rather than long~run
phenomena.
Short term crowdingout
While the long-term effects of government
borrowing upon capital markets may be clear,
the short-term effects are not. Private savings
and investment depend upon three basic varia-
bles: (1) the current level of income, (2)
wealth, or the presentvalue of the flow offuture
consumption, and (3) interest rates, a cost to
investors, buta returnto savers. Roughly speak-
ing, interest rates are the relative prices that
bring about the desired balance between present
income and wealth to be used in the future,
while investment measures the amount of pres-
ent expenditure for the purpose of increasing
wealth.
Short run crowding out depends upon the
relative levels of savings and investment-and
ultimately upon the underlying economic vari~
abIes that affect savings and investment.
We consider first the effects of the variables
income and wealth upon savings and invest-
ment, and also their effects upon interest rates.
We consider two cases (1) a temporary decline
in income with wealth unchanged, and (2) a
decline in wealth with income unchanged.
If income should decline unexpectedly, due
to some outside "shock" that did not affect
wealth, what would happen to capital markets?
Without some additional assumptions, we are
not sure. Savings will decline and so will invest-
ment, but without knowledge of the relative
magnitude of these declines, we cannot be cer-
tain of the effect upon interest rates. In this
circumstance, it is reasonable to suppose income
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andwealth to be "normal"goods. Thatis, when
income declines, individuals attempt to main-
tain their current consumption, at the expense
of investment, thereby depressing interest rates.
Savings. will decline as well, due to the com~
bined effects of falling interest rates and falling
income.
The effect of an unexpected decline in wealth
with income unchanged is in some respects sim~
ilar to the effect of a decline in intome. Both
savings and investment will decline.. But again,
because income and wealth are normal goods,
the decline in investment will notbe sufficient to
return the relative price of income to its old
level. The rate of interest must increase.
Capital markets are simply the place where
people trade to adjust their claims between in-
come and wealth. If the resources of an econ-
omy are reduced, either through a reduction in
present production or through a reduction in
capacity to produce in the future, ind~viduals
will reduce their holdings of both present and
future income. The source of the initial reduc-
tion, be it income or wealth, will become rela-
tively more expensive thereafter, until income
and wealth are returned·to their old balance.
In sum, an unexpected decline in income tends
to reduce interest rates, while an unexpected
decline in wealth increases interest rates.
This construction gives us a framework for
determining the short term effects of fiscal pol~
icy upon capital markets, and helps lay bare
the different views of economic behavior that
lead economists to disagree upon the question
of crowding~out. But the analysis skirts some
critical questions. For example: (1) Is a reces-
sion simply a decline in income, or does wealth
decline as well? (2) What are the effects of
monetary and fiscal policy upon the levels of
income and wealth?
It would be easier to discuss the relevance
of crowding out if we could be sure of the role
of wealth in the U.S. economy and the effect of
government policies upon it. Unfortunately, it
would also be presumptuous to do so. We will
consider crowding out within the context of two
poles of current opinion, but will find that thesetwo extremes have an unfortunate property-
one cannot look at the data andtell which is the
correct point of view. We shall suppose that
the economy is separated into three entities:
the household, which earns, spends and saves;
the firm, which organizes production, and dis-
tributes capital; and the government, which
spends, taxes and borrows.
Alternative 1: "Deficits do notspur economic
growth" In a world so defined, consumers and
producers behave rationally given the informa-
tion at their disposal. Their desires are com-
municated easily and efficiently through signals
transmitted in various markets. Through the
prices they accept and the quantities they trade,
market participants express their accurate judg-
ment of the amounts of each item they wish to
buy and sell, given limitations on their various
resources. A summary measure of the avail-
ability of future resources to the consumer is his
wealth, the capitalized value of the income he
expects to receive in the future. Wealth plays
an important role in consumer behavior in this
world where deficits do not "work." It con-
tributes stability to the economy'. When income
declines temporarily in a recession, individuals
react by cutting their spending less than they
would if the decline in income were permanent.
They cut spending relatively little because the
wealth upon which the spending decision is
based depends upon future income as well as
present income. The recession is not expected
to affect income permanently. Since consumers
base their spending decisions upon wealth, con-
sumption'declines less than income and helps
to increase demand for present goods and
services.
This phenomena is the primary force that ac-
counts for the economy's natural tendency to
bring itself out of a recession. In this world, a
federal deficit cannot help the recovery because
deficits do not increase total wealth. A deficit
is government borrowing to be paid out of
future taxes. That is, the government borrows,
gives the proceeds to taxpayers, and pays for
the debt incurred out of future taxrevenues. As
a result, lower present taxes are purchased at
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the expense of higher future taxes, leaving the
taxpayer with more income during the deficit,
butless income as the deficit is repaid. Overthe
long haul, the taxpayer breaks even, so that a
deficit does notincrease wealth.
Example of an impotent deficit
Consider the'case of a consumer who expects a disposable
income (income after taxes and transfer payments) of $200
per year in perpetuity. Out of this income, he consumes
$180 and saves $20. Now, as a result of a recession; he
experiences a one year decline in income,say to $150. Since
this decline is temporary, he nonetheless expects to receive
$200 in sU'cceeding years. Our consumer realizes he is
going to be worse off, but sees no reason to bear,the entire
brunt of his misfortune in the present. He therefore decides
to bormw $29 from· past savings' and consumes his entire
income (now $179) in the present, reducing his future
consumption by enough to replace his savings. Assuming
his repayment schedule is to be $1 per year in perpetuity, 1e
will consume $179 henceforth out of an income, net of
interest payments, of $199. His consumption expenditures
in the present have risen fmm $150 to $179, a natural force
for recovery from the recession. However a tax cut would
not affect this consumer's current consumption expenditures.
Suppose he received an extra $':1.9 tax cut at thispoint. He
knows the government borrowed to pay ,him this $2<;), so
that he will owe $1 more in taxes each year to repay the
government loan. This $29 tax cut enables him to payoff
his previous loan and to replace his $1 interest payment
with a $1 increase in taxes. His reduced private borrowing
is replaced by government borrowing in the same amount.
He still spends $179 per year now and if! the future. Crowd"
ing out has occurred because his private demand for savings
has been replaced by an equal amount of government de-
mand for savings. Interest rates would remain unchanged,
however, since total net borrowing is unchanged.
In this example, the consume.r has already
expressed his preference for present and future
income in the marketplace for savings and in-
vestment. Infact, inthis exalllple the consumer,
in effect, "saves" his entire tax reduction. But
if the consumer saves the entire proceeds of the
deficit, the deficit will have no, effect upon
sp~nding~andit was toincrease spendingthat
the deficit was incurred in the first place! The
deficit is impotent.
In this world larger government deficits do
nothing except perhaps ease the lot of elected
officials. Consumer spending decisions are un-
affected. Itis worth noting, however, that while
government borrowing replaces private borrow~
ing in this world, there is no effect upon
interest' rates. For every dollar the Treasury
borrows, consumers save an extra dollar. The
amount of savings available to private borrow-ers is the same as it would have been without a
deficit.
Crowding out is important in this scenario.
Crowding out definitely occurs in the sense that
for every dollar borrowed by the government,
the private sector reduces its net borrowing by
a dollar. But iI).terest rates are unaffected. In
essence, the private sector simply replaces a net
loan from. itself with a loan from the govern-
ment. This loan takes the form of reduced taxes,
and is repaid in the form of higher future taxes.
In sum, this short-run analysis has the same
implication about a deficit's neutral effect upon
GNP and interestrates as the long-run analysis
does.
Alternative 2: "Deficits are important"
There is another way to look at the world-
a way that views fiscal stimulus as very im-
portant. This cosmology has been framed by
Axel Leijonhufvud.
1 He posits a crucial role for
government deficits in the smooth running of an
economy, based on the view that a recession is
a communications failure. In this world, the
firm is a creature of the moment. During a re-
cession the firm tends to ignore the possibility
of future pressure upon capacity in deciding
upon current capital expenditures. When use
of capacity is low, this myopic firm does not
take advantage of low interest rates to borrow
ahead for future expansion needs. Itwaits until
its sales approach its productive capacity before
entering bond and equity markets to fund cap-
ital outlays. Ifthe recession is not a permanent
condition, this decision is irrational, since it in-
creases the eventual cost of capital to the firm.
The consumer, according to Leinjonhufvud,
may be guilty of this same sort of myopia. He
does not reduce wage demands as rapidly as the
firm reduces its desires for labor, because he is
not aware that reduced desires for labor are a
prevalent condition, rather than simply a phe-
nomenon peculiar to his own employer. Fur-
thermore in contrast to the consumer of the first
cosmology, he believes the recession-induced
decline in income to be permanent. The result
of this myopia is disastrous. Because producer
and consumer see the recession as permanent,
they lower their expectations of future income
or wealth and make spending decisions accord-
ingly. As a result of (his lowering of planned
spending, the recession becomes permanent!
This permanent decline in income has an in-
teresting property. Ifconsumers and producers
could bepersuaded that a decline in income and
spending is temporary, it would in fact be tem-
porary. Thus they need some outside force to
increase their incomes. In the right circum-
stances, an increase in income will be seen as
permanent and therefore will be permanent,
since the economyhas the ability to sustain such
an increase once it is set upon the right track.
This is the critical role of the deficit. When a
tax cut increases income temporarily, the effects
of the added future taxes are not important,
because the consumer expects his income to rise
to a greaterextent thanhis taxbill, thereby mak-
ing him better off despite the extra tax pay-
ments..An example of the·behavior of a con-
sumer in Leijonhufvud's world helps to clarify
this notion.
/~ Exampleofan effective deficit
Consider the consumer of example 1. He expects to make
$200 per year in perpetuity. A recession reduces his income
to $150. Because he views this reduction as permanent, he
considers himself to be permanently poorer. He therefore
reduces spending. His new level of spending is consistent
with lower total wealth and lower income. There is no
reason to expect this economy ever to return to the old level
of income~ At this point we suppose the government intro-
duces a $50 tax cut, raising the consumer's disposable in-
come to its old $200 level. Since the myopic consumer views
this increased income as permanent, he revises his plans
and assumes a permanent flow of income of $200. He will
be slightly disappointed since his taxes will go up to some
extent to repay the government borrowing-his future dis-
posable income will actually be about $199 per year, the
same as the consumer in the first example-but he will be
far better off than he would have been, had there been no
tax cut.
Crowding-out is more a problem in the
Leijonhufvud cosmology than in the world of
impotent deficits. The deficit in our second ex-
ample is a large one, sufficient to restore the
consumer to his old level of disposable income,
but $20 of this increase in disposable income is
saved, so that only $30 of the deficit is required
in additional savings to support it. Interest rates
will therefore rise to induce the additional
savings.
40Inthe world where deficits matter, crowding-
out in the. form of.higher interest. rates is a
serious possibility. Indeed, a tax. Cl,lt serves to
increase.present income, but it has no direct
effect·upon wealth. As indicated earlier, in the
case of increased income •with wealth un-
changed, interest rates will rise, bringing a re-
coveryto a prematurehalt.•Inthiscircumstance
it is necessary to induce an increase in wealth
as well, to convince the consumer·that.his in-
creased income is permanent. This goalll1ay be
accomplished through expansion in the money
supply, sincemoney is part of total wealth. For
this reason Leijophufvud gives monetary policy
an important role in government anti-recession
policy..As the qu~ntityof money expands,
wealth increases and future taxes decline be-
cause of reduced government borrowing from
the private sector. As wealth increases relative
to income, interest rates fall, and the recovery
is undeFway.
Who is right?
With.differences ofopinion of this magnitude,
one wotl1d expectthatbylookingatthebehavior
of the economy during a recession, we could
draw some broad conclusions about the com-
parative strength of the two opposing positions.
Unfortunately this is not an easy matter. First,
fiscal policy is "automatically" stimulative dur-
ing a recovery. Indeed, a large part of the in-
creased deficit during a recession has little to do
with the policy maker's intent to stimulate the
economy, but is rather a consequence of the
structure of pre-recession legislation governing
Federal payments and receipts. This "auto-
matic" portion ofthe deficit occurs largely be-
cause of the decline in tax receipts associated
with the recessionary decline in income, and be-
cause of increased expenditures associated with
various measures intended to reduce the burden
ofunemployment. In ourfirst world, where this
stimulus does not matter, it also does not harm
the recovery. The damage done is long term-
the government share of private saving is per-
manently increased. In other words, the recov-
ery behaves as though it occurred as a result of
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fiscal stimulus (which actually had no effect)
and monetary stimulus (which does affect in-
come indirectly through its effect upon wealth).
In the second world, where income increases
because of fiscal and monetary stimulus, gov-
ernment's share of savings is increased through
a deficit-financed tax cut, butthe level of private
investment is actually higher than it would
otherwise be. Fiscal and monetary policy have
permanently increased bothincomeand wealth,
and have •therefore increased private saving
enough to leave plenty of added savings for the
private sector. Although the government slice
of the savings pie is greater, the pie itself has
grown through fiscal and monetary stimulus.
What's apolicy-makerto do?
This picture of the uncertain effects of fiscal
stimulus seems to leave the policy-maker very
much at sea. To leave this impression would
be unjust. In fact, the choice of policy at any
given time is less doubtful than the above anal-
ysis suggests because the risks involved in being
"wrong" about. the effects of fiscal stimulus are
far from symmetrical. If the Alternative 1 is
correct-i.e., deficits are not stimulative-and
we choose Alternative 2, no important adverse
effects will occur. Households will simply re-
duce private borrowings by an amount equal to
the Government deficit. However, if Alterna-
tive 2 is correct-i.e., deficits are stimulative-
and we choose Alternative 1, there will be a
more severe recession than otherwise. In this
circumstance the sensible policy response is to
assume deficits are stimulative and reduce taxes
in a recession. What is needed is a balanced
government budget or surplus at the peak of the
business cycle to reduce the long-term govern-
ment demand for private savings to its prere-
cession level.
Furthermore one important assumption un-
derlying the theory that fiscal policy does not
stimulate recovery is actually mistaken. Gov-
ernment borrowing implicit in fiscal policy is
not a perfect substitute for private borrowing.
The risks involved in a loan from one private
citizen to another are greater than the risk oflending to the. U.S. Government. As a result,
private lending is accomplished only ata higher
rate ofinterestthanpublic borrowing. The sub-
stitution of fiscal policy for private borrowing
works to reduce the interest cost oftransferring
funds from saver to spender.
Summary an<;l conclusion
We have considered. the issue of crowding out
ill boththelorigterni andthe shortterni. In. the
long term, we adopt the common assumption
ofa"n.eutral" e.ffect offiscal policyuponpiivate
savings behavior. Given this assumption, we
have found that persistent deficits would indeed
retard private capital accumulation. However,
this crowding out would not be reflected in
high~r interest rates. Thus deficit crowding out
of private investment in capital markets is en-
tirely analogous to the crowding out of private
expenditures by those of the government.
In contrast, our analysis suggests that the
short-term effects of fiscal policy upon'capital
markets and interest rates are uncertain.. We
examine two polar cases: (1). where the deficit
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provides no assistance in speeding an economic
recovery and (2) where without a deficit there
is no momentum provided by the economyitself
to recover. We discover the unfortunate fact
that, given the policy decisions of fiscal and
monetary policy to be stimulative, it is impos-
sible to tell which of these two possibilities is
correct. .Nonetheless, our analysis suggests that
under the worst circumstances (fiscal policy
impot~nt) there is nO damagein short-run fiscal
stimulus) while under the best circumstances
there is much to be gained. In the depths ofa
recession, fiscal stimulus is well advised. But to
avoid long-term damage, it is equally necessary
to reduce this stimulus as the economy recovers,
balancing recessionary deficits with surpluses
during periods of economic health;
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